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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

ceedings are incompatible with the procedures of articles 765
and 768.w In both instances the requirements of these articles
would only undermine the desired informalities in such proceedings.
Ronald Loyd Holmes
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IN LOUISIANA
Medical malpractice 1 in Louisiana has been defined as a
physician or surgeon's dereliction from his professional duty
to possess and exercise the skill ordinarily employed by the
members of his profession; or as a breach of his duty to apply
this skill to the case with reasonable care and diligence, along
with his best judgment.2 If the definition of medical malpractice
were so limited, those actions arising out of professional conduct,
but not based upon a want of professional skill and reasonable
care, would be excluded. However, actions which may not fall
within the above definition, such as abandonment or unauthorized medical treatment, are frequently classified as malpractice
actions. The primary purpose of this paper is to compare the
principles of tort law to the problems of the medical malpractice
action.
60. LA. CODS CRIM. P. art. 15: "A. The provisions of this Code, except as

otherwise specifically provided by other statutes, shall govern and regulate
the procedure in criminal prosecutions and proceedings in district courts.
They also shall govern criminal prosecutions in city, parish, juvenile, and
family courts, except insofar as a particular provision is incompatible with
the general nature and organization of, or special procedures established or
authorized by law for, those courts." (Emphasis added.)
Comment (d) lends direction in interpreting article 15 by providing that
"[a]pplication of this Code to city courts presents a particularly difficult and
important problem. Many rules of the Code apply to all criminal prosecutions. Others, by their very nature, are inapplicable to the more informal
procedures for the trial of minor cases in city courts."
1. "Malpractice. A dereliction from professional duty whether intentional, criminal or merely negligent by one rendering professional services
that result in injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services or
to those entitled to rely upon them or that affects the public interest
adversely."
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(1969).

2. See Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 619, 73 So.2d
781, 782 (1953): "A physician, surgeon or dentist . . . is not required to
exercise the highest degree of skill and care possible. As a general rule
it is his duty to exercise the degree of skill ordinarily employed, under
similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in good standing
in the same community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence,
along with his best judgment, in the application of his skill to the case."
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Existence of Duty
A basic principle of tort law is that, as a prerequisite to
tort liability, the defendant must have breached a legal duty
owed to the injured party; furthermore, this breach must have
been the legal cause of the injury.
In most jurisdictions the physician's duty has been grounded
in his tort obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill toward
his patient; however, some jurisdictions view the physicianpatient relationship as contractual.a Louisiana courts apparently
have adopted the view that the physician's and surgeon's duty
to possess and exercise skill and care is founded in tort and
4
is not the result of an implied contract.
Once the physician-patient relationship is established, the
law imposes a duty upon the physician or surgeon to exercise
reasonable care and skill.5 However, the physician is under no
duty to undertake the treatment of a case, nor is he liable for
his failure to do so.6 Further, he may limit his practice with
3. Prior to the emergence of negligence as a separate tort, the physician's duty to possess and exercise skill and care appears to have been
founded on the notion that his was a public calling, somewhat like that
of an innkeeper or public carrier; hence, he had undertaken to render
proper service, for the breach of which he might be liable. See D. LOUISELL
& H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES § 8.03 (rev. ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as LOUIsELL & WILIAMS]; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS § 28, at 139 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
As modern contract concepts developed, the physician's duty to exercise
care and skill toward his patient was expressed In terms of Implied contract, and much of the development of the law on professional liability
of physicians and surgeons was based on this theory. See McCoid, The
Care Requ red of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 551 (1959).
Since the emergence of negligence as a separate tort, the physician's duty
has been grounded in his tort obligation to exercise due care toward his
patient. But recent decisions have not entirely abandoned the view that
the physician-patient relationship is contractual. See LOuISELL & WILLIAMS
§ 8.03.
4. Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959). See Stern v. Lanng,
106 La. 738, 31 So. 303 (1901) (apparently the first reported malpractice
case in Louisiana; the case was founded In tort). But see O'Ferrall v.
Nashville Bridge Co., 165 La. 963, 116 So. 399 (1928); Spencer v. West, 126
So.2d 423 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (actions by physicians against patients
or others for payment for services rendered).
5. Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 (1963); Dowling v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 So.2d 107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). See PROSSER
§ 92, at 613. For a general discussion on the creation of the physicianpatient relationship and the duty imposed thereby, see Kozan v. Coinstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
6. Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 761, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (1959);
Butterworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) (the defendant was the only available
physician); PROSSER § 92, at 615; McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 553-57 (1959); LOUISELL & WILLIAMs § 8.02;
Of. Vidrine v. Mayes, 127 So.2d 809 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

regard to working hours and to the place where services are
8
rendered 7 as well as to the scope of services offered.
Normally the physician-patient relationship is a consensual
one, i.e., the patient seeks the services of the physician, and the
physician knowingly accepts him as a patient and undertakes
treatment.0 However, the physician-patient relationship may be
established under other circumstances. 10 Once the physician
begins treatment, he is under a duty to continue his services
until they are no longer needed and is not free to terminate the
relationship at will." An unjustified termination of the relationship which worsens the position of the patient is a breach of
2
duty and constitutes abandonment.1

The physician may also enter into an express contract to
render services; and if he fails to perform, he is liable for all
injuries proximately caused by the breach of his contractual
duty. 13 But if he begins performance by undertaking treatment,
7. Vidrine v. Mayes, 127 So.2d 809 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
8. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS § 8.02, at 192.
9. Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959); Harley v.
Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Tvedt v. Hougen, 70 N.D. 338,
294 N.W. 183 (1940).
10. The relationship may be established when a third person, such as a
parent, guardian or employer has employed the physician and the patient
has accepted his services. See Nations v. Ludington, Wells & Van Schaick
Lmbr. Co., 133 La. 657, 63 So. 257 (1913); Klein v. Williams, 199 Miss. 699,
12 So.2d 421 (1943). Further, the relationship may be established when the
physician volunteers his services, perhaps to one who is unable to consent.
But the rendering of gratuitous emergency services may not render the
physician liable in Louisiana for his acts or omissions in rendering such
services. See LA. R.S. 37:1731 (1950). Some contacts between a person and
a physician do not result in a physician-patient relationship, e.g., when
an examination is conducted for purposes of insurance, employment or
litigation. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 183 Miss. 859, 184 So. 426
(1938). However, if services are offered and accepted, a physician-patient
relationship will be established. See Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
26 Cal. 2d 149, 157 P.2d 1 (1945).
11. Vidrine v. Mayes, 127 So.2d 809 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
12. Actions founded upon abandonment are a separate entity in malpractice law. See McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950);
Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d
432 (1957). Abandonment is an unjustified termination of the relationship
which worsens the position of the patient. The physician's services may be
justifiably terminated only if his services are no longer required, the
patient consents to the termination, or the physician withdraws giving
proper and reasonable notice to the patient under circumstances where
the patient can procure another physician If necessary. See Dale v. Donaldson Lmbr. Co., 48 Ark. 188, 2 S.W. 703 (1887); Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash.
2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942).
13. Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959); Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 (1963); Brooks v. Robinson, 163 So.2d 186
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise care and skill,
in addition to his contractual duties.14 Thus, the plaintiff's action
may be founded in tort or in contract. The type of action that
the plaintiff chooses is important with regard to the effect upon
prescription, the theory of proof, and the recovery of damages. 15
The Standard of Care
The most widely accepted expression in Louisiana of the
standard of care and skill expected of physicians and surgeons
appears in Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co.,' 6 where
the court said:
"A physician, surgeon or dentist, . . . is not required to
exercise the highest degree of skill and care possible. As a
general rule it is his duty to exercise the degree of skill
ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the
members of his profession in good standing in the same
community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best judgment in the application of his
''7
skill to the case.
This duty has not only been imposed upon physicians, surgeons
and dentists, but has been extended to veterinarians 8 and
14. Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 (1963); Dowling v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 So.2d 107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). See PROSSE
§ 92, at 613.
15. A breach of the duty imposed by law may also be a breach of
a contractual duty; the party is entitled to one or the other action as
his interest dictates. Brooks v. Robinson, 163 So.2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964). See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 143 La.
467, 78 So. 738 (1918). If the action is founded in tort, the one year prescriptive period for offenses and quasi-offenses provided for in LA. CV. CODE art.
3536 is applicable. Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959); Phelps
v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 (1963); Brooks v. Robinson, 163
So.2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). The prescriptive period runs from the
day the patient knows or should have known of the causal relationship
between his injury and the defendant's act. Breaux v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 272 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. La. 1967); Springer v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
169 So.2d 171 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934). If the action is in contract, the prescriptive period
Is ten years. Brooks v. Robinson, 163 So.2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964);
LA. Civ. CODE art. 3544. See Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959);
Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 (1963).
16. 225 La. 618, 619, 73 So.2d 781, 782 (1953). Actually, the first Louisiana
decision to formulate a standard of care for physicians and surgeons which
contained all of the elements and qualifications of the modern standard
was Roark v. Peters, 162 La. 111, 110 So. 106 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1926). This
standard was rephrased in Meyer.
17. 255 La. at 623, 73 So.2d at 782.
18. Dyess v. Caraway, 190 So.2d 666 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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nurses, 19 as well as technicians, attendants and others engaged
in related branches of the medical profession. 20 However, this
21
standard has not been applied to a defendant chiropractor.
The qualifying term "in good standing" which appears in
the Meyer standard simply refers to those physicians who are
licensed practitioners. The qualification "under similar circumstances" alludes to the circumstance of the case, thus reducing
the range of comparisons and producing a more relevant standard.
The medical practitioner is to be judged by the customary
practice of the members of the class of practitioners to which
he belongs. 22 This principle was recognized by the Louisiana
19. Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962);
Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
20. Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962).
21. In Edkins v. Edwards, 235 So.2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), the
defendant chiropractor was found to have manipulated the plaintiff's neck
in such fashion as to cause a cervical disc rupture. The court refused to
apply a professional standard to his actions and evaluated his conduct
under ordinary tort law. The basis of this refusal was that he was not
licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners and that there was no
evidence presented as to the standard of care required in the practice of
chiropractic. Perhaps a better reason for applying ordinary tort law would
have been that the defendant's conduct was such that it could readily
be evaluated by laymen without resort to expert testimony.
22. Dyess v. Caraway, 190 So.2d 666 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966) (veterinarian
is to be judged by the standard practice of veterinarians); Norton v.
Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 244 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) (nurse was negligent in not following the customary practice of nurses); Whyte v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 122 So.2d 297 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (treatment
given by defendant chiropodist was "in line with what any other chiropodist
or surgeon would do").
In Favalora v. Aetna Caw. d Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962), the court stated that a physician has a duty to exercise the skill
and care usually exercised by "similar practitioners" in the same community
or locality.
While a defendant medical practitioner is 'to be judged by the customary
practice of the class to which he belongs, the Louisiana courts will allow
a practitioner of another class to testify at his trial, although the testimony of the witness must be restricted to the standard of practice of
defendant's class of practitioners. In Mournet v. Sumner, 139 So. 728 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1932), an oral surgeon testified at the trial of a general
practitioner of dentistry that his procedure would have been different than
that of the defendant. The court observed that a specialist and a general
practitioner admittedly would have different approaches. In Stern v. Boyce,
200 So.2d 318 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), a thoracic surgeon testified as to the
practice of thoracic surgeons, and the court observed that he was unable
to testify as to the standard of practice of general surgeons, the class to
which the defendant belonged. In Slack v. Fleet, 242 So.2d 650 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970), an Internist testified that his procedure would have differed
from that of the defendant general practitioner, but that the defendant
had conformed to the standard of practice of general practitioners in the
community.
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supreme court in Stern v. Lanng,2 3 in which the court held that
an oculist must exercise the care and skill usually exercised by
oculists in good standing. Apparently this principle is no more
than an application of the general tort doctrine that if one holds
himself out as having special skills, the standard of care is modi24
fied accordingly.
Though the standard of care as expressed in Meyer is qualified by a "locality rule" that a physician must be evaluated in
relation to "the members of his profession in good standing in
the same community or locality,"25 it is submitted that this
qualification is not, nor should it be, as fixed and unyielding as
28
it appears.
In other jurisdictions, until very recently, the standard of
care applicable to physicians was qualified geographically to the
same community in which the physician practicedY The purpose was to protect the country physician who lacked the
resources and opportunities afforded the city physician. 28 As
communication improved and the physician gained the opportunity to keep abreast of advances in his profession, the "same
locality" became too narrow a qualification and began to yield
to an ever broadening locality rule.29 Jurisdictions began to
express the standard of care in terms of that customarily prac23. 106 La. 738, 31 So. 303 (1901).
24. An interesting question is whether or not a general practitioner
will be held to the standards of a specialist if he undertakes to perform
services in a special branch of medicine when there is available in the
community a specialist in that field. Louisiana has no case which has
considered this question. The general rule is that a general practitioner
Is not required to exercise the degree of care and skill commensurate with
that exercised by those classified as specialists. The policy underlying these
decisions is that the public must rely upon the general practitioner to
care for a large portion of human ills, and a wholesale acceptance of a
higher standard of practice would force the general practitioner out of the
picture entirely. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12
VAND. L. Ruv. 549, 566-69 (1959). For these same reasons a stringent duty
to refer to a specialist cannot be imposed upon the general practitioner,
for to do so would require that he possess the same knowledge of the
specialist, a result which might discourage the general practice of medicine.
25. Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 623, 73 So.2d 781,
782 (1953).
26. For a history of the locality rule in other jurisdictions and its
diminishing significance see Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431
P.2d 973 (1967); LOUISELL & WILLIAMS § 8.06; PROSSER § 32, at 164; McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 569-75
(1959).
27. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
28. Id. at 77, 431 P.2d at 977.
29. PRossER § 32, at 164.
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ticed by physicians in "similar localities" 80 or "geographic
areas"8' within which there were similar opportunities for experience and the accumulation of knowledge.
The present trend is away from a fixed locality rule. In
Pederson v. Dumouchel,s2 the Washington court, after noting
that there was no longer a lack of opportunity for a physician
or surgeon to keep abreast of the advances made in his profession, stated that local practice within geographic proximity
is but one of many factors to be considered in determining the
standard of care. The court further stated: "No longer is it
proper to limit the definition of the standard of care which a
medical doctor or dentist must meet solely to the practice or
custom of a particular locality, a similar locality or a geographic
area. ' 33 This court defined the standard of care as "that established in an area coextensive with medical and professional
means available in those centers that are readily accessible for
3 4
appropriate treatment of the patient.
Although Meyer did not specifically address itself to the
locality rule, it was in fact part of the standard of care expressed
by the court.35 However, recently in Uter v. Bone & Joint
0
Clinic,"
the supreme court affirmed a decision in which a New
30. Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880). But see Brune v. Belinkoff,
354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) overruling Small and abandoning a
geographic proximity test in determining the standard of care.
31. Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916).
32. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
33. Id. at 79, 431 P.2d at 978.
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying note 17 supra. Actually, the supreme court
first announced a locality rule In Roark v. Peters, 162 La. 111, 110 So. 106
(1926), where it stated that a physician was to possess the degree of skill
exercised by members of his profession practicing In "similar localities."
This rule was in keeping with the trend in other jurisdictions at that time
and was followed by subsequent cases. See Mournet v. Sumner, 139 So. 728
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932); Lett v. Smith, 6 La. App. 248 (2d Cir. 1927). In
Well v. McGehee, 39 So.2d 196, 199 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949), the court, purporting to follow the previous line of cases, stated that a physician must
possess the skill "common with the profession in the locality where the
physician or surgeon happens to practice." Later, in Meyer, the supreme
court defined the standard of care as that established in "the same community or locality." It is doubtful that the court would purposefully state
a rule more restrictive than that appearing in Roark, when the national
trend was toward an ever broadening locality rule.
36. 249 La. 851, 192 So.2d 100 (1966). Some recent decisions lend support
to the Idea that the locality rule referred to in Meyer is not to be narrowly
construed. See Zachary v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 249 So.2d 273 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971); Henry v. McCool, 239 So.2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
(New Orleans physicians testified as to the standard of practice at the
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Orleans physician testified at the trial of a Baton Rouge physician as to the standard of care in both communities, intimating
that the Meyer locality rule is not to be so narrowly construed.
It is submitted that the locality rule should not be so
narrowly construed as to limit the scope of inquiry to what is
the customary procedure in the place where the defendant
practices; nor should the rule limit the community from which
expert testimony may be sought. Rather, more emphasis should
be placed upon the character of the defendant's practice in
terms of his opportunities for experience and acquisition of
information concerning advances in the medical profession1
When a question of negligence is involved, custom and usage
generally are competent evidence for determining the proper
standard of conduct; 38 but such evidence is not conclusive proof
of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. However, in a
medical malpractice action custom does become, almost exclusively, the measure of reasonable care. 39 Since the first reported
medical malpractice case in Louisiana, the measure of reasonable care has been the defendant's treatment of a patient in
the "usual and customary" manner employed by other physicians
in good standing. 4 However, customary practice is not conclutrial of a Baton Rouge physician). In Ross v. Hatchette, 251 So.2d 820 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971), a New Orleans general practitioner testified at the trial
of a Lake Charles physician, but there is no indication that he testified
as to the standard of care. But see Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918 (5th Cir.
1971), where the court strictly construed the locality rule.
There should be no objection to receiving testimony from outside the
community as to the issue of causation, and in Herbert v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 239 So.2d 367 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), the depositions of Florida physicians as to the cause of the plaintiff's injury were admitted into evidence.
37. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND.
L. Rv. 549, 575 (1959).
38. Harris Drilling Co. v. Delafleld, 222 La. 416, 62 So.2d 627 .(1952);
see PREOSSER § 33, at 166-68.
39. PROSSER § 32, at 165.
40. Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 73 So.2d 781
(1953). See Roark v. Peters, 162 La. 111, 110 So. 106 (1926); Gouner v. Brosnan, 155 La. 1, 98 So. 681 (1923); Ayala v. King-Ryder Lmbr. Co., 146 La.
536, 83 So. 799 (1920); Stern v. Lanng, 106 La. 738, 31 So. 303 (1901). In
Mournet v. Sumner, 139 So. 728, 730 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932), the court said:
"The rule is well established that a physician or dentist cannot be held
liable for the death of a patient under his treatment, where there is no
evidence to show negligence or lack of skill on his part, sufficient to overcome the prima facie case In his favor made by the evidence that the treatment adopted by him was the usual and customary one. The fact that the
patient died under such circumstances does not raise any presumption of
negligence or lack of skill on his part." In Wells v. McGehee, 39 So.2d 196,
199 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949), the court said: "[Wihere the physician or surgeon uses all the customary precautions practiced by the profession in
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sive as to due care where that practice is contrary to what is
taught in medical schools and is recognized by other members
of the profession as being faulty, though they too may follow
41
the same customary practice.
In Roark v. Peters,42 the plaintiff complained that a sponge
(gauze pad) had been left in her abdomen during a caesarean
operation. In affirming a judgment for the defendant, the
supreme court examined the customary sponge-counting procedures used to insure that no sponze would be left in a patient,
intimating that the following of such a customary practice would
be due care as a matter of law. The court rejected the argument
that "[t]he fact that he did leave a sponge or instrument in the
body . . . is, in itself, and without any explanatory expert testimony, sufficient to convince any reasonable man or any court that
the defendant was guilty of negligence. ''43 However, in the recent
case of Grant v. Touro Infirmary,"44 on almost identical facts,
the same court held that failure to remove a sponge or pad may
be regarded as negligence per se, and that a physician cannot
be relieved of liability by reliance on a custom or hospital rule
requiring the attending nurse to count the sponges used and
removed.
The position taken in Roark v. Peters seems to be the better
view, for a customary practice may be reasonably safe without being absolutely safe. A physician is only required to use
reasonable care, and the failure of the customary procedure
to prevent the leaving of a sponge or instrument in the body
of a patient should not create automatic liability. It is submitted that a jury should be allowed to infer negligence from
the presence of the sponge in the body, but the physician should
be able to exculpate himself by showing that the customary
procedure he followed is reasonably safe. In addition, he should
be allowed to show circumstances under which his act was reathe particular locality, no liability is incurred." In Lindsey v. Michigan Mut.
Liab. Co., 156 So.2d 313, 316 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La. 461,
158 So.2d 612 (1963), the court said: "Whether [the physician] has complied with that degree of care required in treating a patient is measured
by the skill ordinarily employed by the members of his profession in good
standing in his community in treating the same complaint or injury."
41. Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962).
42. 162 La. 111, 110 So. 106 (1926).
43. Id. at 115, 110 So. at 108.
44. 254 La. 204, 223 So.2d 148 (1969).
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sonable, such as an emergency or other situation in which prolonged search for a sponge or instrument would be dangerous
to the patient.
Other jurisdictions have expressed the standard of care
expected of a physician in much the same way as has Louisiana;
yet some of these jurisdictions have defined specific duties and
obligations to which a physician must adhere.45 The Louisiana
courts, with rare exception,4 6 have not chosen to define particular duties, at least not with any degree of definiteness. Thus,
a physician's performance has been evaluated in terms of what
other physicians in the community would do under like cir47
cumstances.
Louisiana courts have intimated that a physician's failure
to inform a patient of the nature, risk and consequences of
treatment is a breach of duty vitiating consent. 48 This duty to
inform usually involves cases in which the physician fails to
make sufficient disclosures concerning the treatment to enable
the patient to exercise an informed consent. This failure of
45. Some of these particular duties are: to keep abreast of his profession; to take and examine the history of the patient; to heed the complaints of the patient; to instruct the patient in self-care; to attend the
patient as long as his services are needed; to inform or disclose facts;
to follow the progress of the patient. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS § 8.05.
46. Vidrine v. Mayes, 127 So.2d 809 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (the court
defined a duty to attend). See Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119
So.2d 649, 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960), where the court intimated a duty
to inform: "The general rule prohibiting the performance of an operation
without the consent of the patient extends to the performance of . . .
operations involving risk and results not contemplated."
47. Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1966) (failure to heed complaints of patient); Ross v. Hatchette, 251
So.2d 820 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (failure to properly examine, e.g., failure
to use X ray in diagnosis); Thompson v. Brent, 245 So.2d 751 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971) (failure to heed complaints of patient); Langston v. St.
Charles Hospital, 202 So.2d 386 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (failure to use
X ray in examination).
It has been suggested that defined particular duties are no more than
a recognition by the courts of professional standards established by the
medical profession itself and a reflection of the growing understanding
that the layman has of medical matters. McCoid, The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 575-98 (1959).
48. See Theodore v. Ellis, 141 La. 709, 75 So. 655 (1917), where a physician
performed an unnecessary and dangerous operation on the plaintiff. In
rendering judgment for the plaintiff, the court relied in part on the failure
of the physician to inform the patient of the nature and purpose of the
operation. In Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119 So.2d 649, 650 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1960), where the court stated: "The general rule prohibiting
the performance of an operation without the consent of the patient extends
to the performance of . . . operations involving risk and results not contemplated."
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consent must be distinguished from the situation in which a
physician, absent an emergency, renders treatment or operates
without first obtaining consent, 49 or performs an operation different in nature than that to which the plaintiff has consented.
Whether there is a want or failure of consent, the physician's
action "clearly constitutes a trespass against the person in the
nature of an assault and battery and subjects him to liability
for damages." 51 This liability results even though there is no
malpractice on the part of the physician.52
In early cases in other jurisdictions the courts treated a
physician's failure to disclose the nature and consequences of
a proposed treatment as a breach of duty vitiating consent.53
In later years this trend was reversed when it was recognized
that each patient presented a different problem and that full disclosure may be undesirable or even dangerous to the welfare
of some patients. 54 The generally accepted theory today is that
a physician must make a reasonable disclosure of the nature,,
risk and consequences of the proposed treatment. Whether his
disclosure is reasonable depends upon what physicians in the
community would have disclosed under the same or similar
circumstances. 55
49. Except in real and serious emergencies, a physician must acquaint
the patient or, when circumstances require, someone properly acting for
him, of the diagnosis and treatment proposed and obtain express or implied,
consent thereto. Lester v. Aetna Cas. Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957);
Wells v. McGehee, 39 So.2d 198 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
50. In Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119 So.2d 649, 650 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960), where the plaintiff had consented to an appendectomy and
the defendant surgeon performed a complete hysterectomy without the
consent of the patient, with her husband or relatives reasonably available
in the hospital, the court said: "[The] general rule is that the consent of
a patient is a prerequisite to a surgical operation, and the surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent, express or implied,
is liable in damages. This rule is subject to exceptions in event of an
emergency requiring immediate action for the patient under circumstances
in which it is impossible or impracticable to obtain the patient's consent
or the consent of anyone authorized to assume such responsibility. The
general rule prohibiting the performance of an operation without the
consent of the patient extends to the performance of operations different
in nature from that for which a consent was given,. and to operations
involving risk and results not contemplated.
51. Id. at 651.
52. Fleming v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 363 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1966).
53. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186
(1958); PsossPR § 32, at 165.
54. Nathanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
55. Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970); Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862 (Colo. App. 1971); Ditlaw v. Kaplan, 181 So.2d 226 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965); Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971);
Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
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Vicarious Liability
As a general rule the physician is liable for the negligent
acts of his employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 5e
However, an important malpractice question is the liability of
the surgeon for the negligent acts of operating room nurses and
other assistants who are employees of the hospital. Generally,
a surgeon is responsible for all operating room procedures and
cannot escape liability by delegating part of his function to
another.57 However, modern operating room techniques require
team performance and, as a result, nurses and other assistants
are not always under the immediate control and direction of
the operating surgeon. There is a division of control in the
operating room, and under these circumstances there is a presumption that the general employer (the hospital) is liable;
therefore, to escape liability, the general employer must show
that the servant was borrowed and was under the control of
the surgeon. 58 The customary practice of the profession plays
an important role in defining this division of control. For
example, in Andrepont v. Ochsner59 and Meyer v. St. PaulMercury Indemnity Co . it was shown that customarily the
anesthesiologist worked independently and was not under the
control and direction of the operating surgeon.
Proof of the Malpractice Case
The plaintiff in a malpractice action must prove his allegations of negligence by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 61
He must show that the physician breached a legal duty to conform to the standard of care and that this breach is the legal
cause of his compensable injury. 2 When the physician under56. Thompson v. Brent, 245 So.2d 751 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Fairley v.
Douglas, 76 So.2d 576 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1955); LA. Crv. CODS art. 2320.
57. Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1922);
Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So.2d 148 (1969).
58. 254 La. at 220, 223 So.2d at 154. Bee Benoit v. Hunt Tool Co., 219 La.
380, 53 So.2d 137 (1951).
59. 84 So.2d 63 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955).
60. 225 La. 618, 73 So.2d 781 (1954).
61. Hayward v. Echols, 362 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1966); Phelps v. Donaldson,
243 La. 1118, 150 So.2d 35 (1963); Gauner v. Brosnan, 155 La. 1, 98 So. 681
(1923); Freche v. Mary, 16 So.2d 213 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944); Mournet v.
Sumner, 139 So. 728 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
62. Medical malpractice cases present more difficult causation issues
than those found in the ordinary negligence suit. Most plaintiffs in malpractice suits are suffering from some affliction making it difficult to
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takes to treat, he owes the patient the duty to conform to the
professional standard of conduct. 63 Under this standard the physician must exercise the degree of skill ordinarily employed,
under similar circumstances, by the good-standing members of
his profession in the same community or locality; further, he
must use reasonable care and diligence, as well as his best
64
judgment in the application of his skill to the case.
The standard of skill is that of a complex and erudite profession upon which laymen cannot exercise an intelligent judgment requiring medical opinion to prove presence or absence of
skill.6 5 The element of care and diligence (as distinguished from
the element of skill) is stated in terms of "reasonable" and suggests that the trier of fact may draw from his own experience
and judgment in evaluating the conduct of the defendant. However, there is much of the physician's professional conduct which
is not within the common knowledge of the layman. 6 Therefore,
distinguish the natural consequences of the malady from those which
may have been caused by the defendant. For example, see the factual
situation presented in Dowling v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 So.2d. 107 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964), at note 69 infra. What portion of the plaintiff's injuries
there were caused by the delay resulting from the defendant's conduct?
Frequently, the layman is incompetent to evaluate the issue of causation as in Herbert v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 239 So.2d 367 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970), where the plaintiff had suffered permanent injury allegedly
caused by the injection of a highly toxic spinal anesthetic into a nerve
root. Causation was a crucial issue and obviously peculiarly within the
knowledge of experts. Depositions and testimony of numerous physicians
were received in evidence, proving that the injection of the toxic drug
directly into nerve root was an act contrary to professional standards in
the community.
For other Louisiana cases briefly discussing causation see Meyer v.
St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 73 So.2d 781 (1954) (oral surgeon's
failure to examine teeth prior to preparatory procedure was not the cause
of injury); Henry v. McCool, 239 So.2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970) (failure
to take follow-up X ray of plaintiff's hand was not cause of his injury);
Langston v. St. Charles Hospital, 202 So.2d 386 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967)
(failure to take X ray to locate wire embedded in plaintiff's leg was not
the cause of the subsequent injury); Stern v. Boyce, 200 So.2d 318 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967) (failure to take post operative X ray was not the cause
of death).
63. See cases cited note 5 supra.
64. Downs v. American Empl. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1970);
Lejeune v. United States Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. La. 1964); Morgan
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 185 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. La. 1960); Uter v. Bone &
Joint Clinic, 249 La. 851, 192 So.2d 100 (1966); LeMay v. General Ace. Fire &
Life Assur. Corp., 228 So.2d 713 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Thibodeaux v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 216 So.2d 314 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Stern v. Boyce,
200 So.2d 318 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Prack v. United States Fidel. &
Guar. Co., 187 So.2d 170 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
65. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term'Workman's Compensation, 15 LA. L. REV. 310, 311 (1955).
Torts
66. Id. at 311.
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there must frequently be a resort to medical expertise to prove
the customary local practice and the defendant's conformity
therewith.67 If, however, the alleged professional conduct is
within the common knowledge of the trier of fact, he should be
allowed to draw an inference of negligence. For example, if the
6 8
physician spills a bottle of acid on the patient during treatment,
69
or fails to report an X ray result, or fails to heed the complaints
of a patient that the procedure is causing injury,7 0 or if the physician has left a sponge or instrument in the patient's body, 71 the
trier of fact should be allowed to infer negligence without resort
to expert opinion.
When expert testimony and opinion are required to prove
the standard of care and diligence, the expert need not be a
member of the class of practitioners to which the defendant belongs, but his testimony must be restricted to what is the customary practice of the defendant's class, for the defendant is to
be judged by that standard aloneY2 Frequently there are areas
of practice common to the various branches of the medical profession; under these circumstances, there should be no objection
to testimony on these common matters by a physician from a
different class. 8
When the plaintiff is unable to produce an expert witness,
the defendant may be cross-examined as an expert in order to
establish the standard of professional practice.74 Once the standard is established, the plaintiff may then rely on other evidence, such as admissions, to establish the failure of the defen67. rd.
68. Picheloup v. Gibbons, 9 La. App. 380 (Orl. Cir. 1928).
69. Consider the fact situation presented in Dowling v. Mutual Life Ins.,
168 So.2d 107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964): The patient consulted his regular
physician complaining of chest pains. The physician caused a chest X ray
to be taken and informed the patient that the reports were negative. In
fact, there was a positive indication of tubecular infiltration and the condition was discovered some months later, necessitating extensive hospitalization and a lobectomy.
70. Thompson v. Brent, 245 So.2d 751 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
71. Grant -v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So.2d 148 (1969).
72. See note 22 &upra.
73. In Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1966), a general practitioner was allowed to testify at the trial
of a plastic surgeon as to the proper procedure for applying a cast. The
court found that the test for qualification as an expert is whether the witness has actual knowledge of the particular procedure attacked as negligent.
74. Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1971); Oleksiw v. Weidener,
2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965); LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1634.
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dant to conform to that standard. The inability of the plaintiff
to produce an expert witness raises the question as to whether
he may employ, in lieu of medical expert testimony, medical
texts, treatises and articles in professional journals to establish
the standard practice of the profession. This type of evidence
is usually excluded under the hearsay rule. It may be argued
that these works should not be excluded for they are both necessary, in that they may be the only evidence available, and
trustworthy. '75 Additionally, the qualifications of the author may
be established or questioned as if he were present, and the defendant would have an opportunity to challenge content by
showing authority to the contrary. Since the purpose of the rules
of evidence is to control what the jury hears, these arguments
should have greater validity where the trial is before a judge
rather than a jury."0
Numerous cases 7" have quoted Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury
Idemnity Co. with regard to the burden of proof, intimating
that the burden is upon the defendant in a malpractice suit to
exculpate himself. When the standard of care and skill was
formulated in Meyer, the court said:
"[This] rule makes it incumbent on the physician, surgeon
or dentist who becomes defendant in a malpractice case to
show that he is possessed of the required skill and competence indicated and that in applying that skill to the given
case he used reasonable care and diligence along with his
best judgment." 78
75. See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Ass'n Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961). Alabama is the only jurisdiction which today allows the use
of books and treatises as substantive evidence on the basis of jurisprudence.
City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939). However, some
states have adopted statutes which allow the use of books, treatises and
periodicals in a medical malpractice action. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79c
(1956); Nsv. Rsv. STAT. § 51.040 (1968); S.C. CODS ANN. § 26-142 (1962).
76. The author could find but one Louisiana case reporting that the
defendant was allowed to introduce a medical text in support of his defense
that the use of X ray to discover the presence of a fishbone embedded
in flesh is a useless gesture, considering its translucent characteristics.
Lindsey v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 156 So.2d 313 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
77. LeMay v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 228 So.2d 713 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1969); Langston v. St. Charles Hospital, 202 So.2d 386 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967); Stern v. Boyce, 200 So.2d 318 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Osburn
v. Saltz, 169 So.2d 687 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Favalora v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir 1962.); Jacobs v. Beck, 141 So.2d
920 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Thomas v. Lobrano, 76 So.2d 599 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1954).
78. Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 623, 73 So.2d 781
786 (1953).
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Few cases have actually followed this rule, and when it has been
applied, the situation was such that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be said to have applied.1 9 The above quotation does not
mean that failure to obtain a favorable result gives rise to a
presumption of negligence against the practitioner which shifts
the burden of establishing freedom from fault upon him.80 This
same court has said, that "the fact that the treatment has resulted unfavorably does not even raise a presumption of want
of proper care, skill or diligence." 8' If the physician shows that
he treated'the patient in the usual and customary manner there
is a prima facie case in his favor 82 which may be overcome only
by plaintiff's evidence showing lack of skill or that the practice
followed was negligent. 3
Res Ipsa Loquitur
A case in which res ipsa loquitur applies does not differ
from other cases in which negligence is proved by inferences
drawn from circumstantial evidence. The accident is the dominant fact from which the inference is drawn, but before the
court will allow the doctrine to apply, it will require a showing
of the same nature that would be required in any case proved
by circumstantial evidence.8 4 Louisiana courts have consistently
held that to utilize the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the plaintiff
must show that (1) the injury was caused by an agency within
79. Thomas v. Lobrano, 76 So.2d 599 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); cf. Favalora
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Jacobs v.

Beck, 141 So.2d 920 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
80. See Lejeune v. United States Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. La.
1964).
81. Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 1118, 1120, 150 So.2d 35, 37 (1963): "' W hen
a physician undertakes the treatment of a case he does not guarantee a
cure, nor is any promise to effect a cure or even a partial healing to be
Implied, nor does the law raise from the fact of employment an implied
undertaking to cure, but only an undertaking to use ordinary skill and
care .... Of course a physician might contract specifically to cure and he
would be liable on his contract for failure, but, in the absence of such a
special and peculiar contract, the fact that the treatment has resulted
unfavorably does not even raise a presumption of want of proper care, skill
or diligence .... A dentist, like a physician or surgeon, is not an insurer
or guarantor of results, in the absence of an express agreement.'" (Citations
omitted.)
82. Mournet v. Sumner, 139 So. 728 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932). See note 40
'upra.
83. Lejeune v. United States Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. La. 1964).
See Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
84. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of
the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. Rxv. 70, 71-72 (1941).
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the exclusive control of the defendant, (2) evidence of the full
cause of the accident is more readily accessible to the defendant,
and (3) the accident must be one which common knowledge
indicates does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.8 5
The first element is merely a device to assure that there is
little room for competing inferences,"0 for the doctrine cannot
be applied if there are conflicting inferences. 8 7 The second element appears to have no valid purpose other than encouraging
the parties with access to the evidence to bring it before the
court.88 The purpose of the third is to prevent the trier of fact
from inferring negligence when he cannot reasonably do so.
Therefore, res ipsa loquitur is applied in cases in which the trier
may draw from his knowledge and experience, and, from the
facts presented, conclude that negligence is more probably present than not.
In Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co.,8 9 the court of
appeal stated that res ipsa loquitur would not apply if all that
was shown was that the desired results were not accomplished.
But if the complaint were based on the charge that, during the
rendering of professional services there occurred some untoward
event, or some omission or act from which there resulted something not ordinarily found to result during such treatment or
operation, the physician may be required to show that the unusual occurrence did not result from his negligence. In citing
examples in which the doctrine would be applicable, the court
referred to cases in which the physician had left a sponge or an
instrument in the body of the patient. In these illustrative
cases, the layman could rely on his experience and knowledge
to infer negligence from the presence of the item in the body. 0
85. Andrepont v. Ochsner, 84 So.2d 63 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955); Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 748, 751 (1965).

86. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of
the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REv. 70, 81 (1941).
87. Hayward v. Echols, 362 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1966).
88. Comment, 25 LA. L. Rzv. 748, 756 (1965).
89. 61 So.2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1952). Accord, Andrepont .v. Ochsner,
84 So.2d 63 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955).
90. In Jacobs v. Beck, 141 So.2d 920 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), the plaintiff
had undergone abdominal surgery and, on recovering from the anesthesia,
discovered that she had two broken teeth. The court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that res ipsa loquitur applied
and there was a genuine and material issue of fact. This Is the type of
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In the medical malpractice action it will frequently be impossible for the layman to draw an inference of negligence from
the mere existence of an injury; he simply lacks the requisite
expertise. Consequently, in these cases the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur will be of little practical value, for the court must first
be acquainted with the factors pertinent to the probable cause
of the injury. For example, in Herbert v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.,9 ' the patient had suffered injury allegedly from injection of
a spinal anesthetic into a nerve root. It had been proved and
admitted by the defendant that this was never knowingly done,
and that there were procedures available to prevent its happening. The court stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would
apply, but only if the jury found, based on expert testimony,
that the plaintiff's injury resulted from injection of the drug
directly into the nerve root. To so find was sufficient proof of
a failure to comply with the duty of reasonable care; and therefore, the application of res ipsa loquitur was inappropriate.
Thus, it seems that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is of
little practical significance in the Louisiana medical malpractice
action because its application is restricted to those situations in
which the layman can draw from his common knowledge and
experience and conclude that the particular occurrence would
not have happened in the absence of negligence.
Conclusion
One of the most frequent complaints of a plaintiff's attorney
in a medical malpractice action is that the burden of proof is too
difficult. This is especially true when expert testimony and
opinion are required to prove the plaintiff's case, for it is recognized that medical practitioners are reluctant to testify in
a malpractice suit. This burden has been somewhat lessened
by the policy of allowing practitioners from one specialty to
accident which is within the common knowledge and experience of the trier
of fact.
In several recent cases the doctrine was found inapplicable, apparently
because there were conflicting inferences that could be drawn, or the
subject of inquiry was not within the common knowledge of the trier of
fact. Zachary v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, Ins., 249 So.2d 273 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971); LeMay v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Coip., 228 So.2d 713
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Foster v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 212
So.2d 729 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Britt v. Travelers Indem. Co., 205 So.2d
880 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
91. 239 So.2d 367 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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testify at the trial of a physician with another specialty. This
burden could further be reduced by a construction of the "locality rule" which would allow the plaintiff to utilize experts
from a different and distant community, or perhaps from outof-state. Allowing the use of medical books and treatises to
establish the standard of care would also be of benefit, especially when expert medical testimony is not available. If the
courts are reluctant to allow the introduction of these materials
as evidence in medical malpractice actions, perhaps legislation
authorizing the use of books, treatises and other writings would
be in order; however, the court should retain discretion to exclude writings which are irrelevant or to exclude writings when
it finds that the author is not recognized in his profession as
an expert on the subject. Further, the plaintiff's burden could
be eased by allowing the defendant himself to be cross-examined
as an expert witness as to the standard of care.
It is submitted that the standard of care and skill applicable
to physicians and surgeons should not be altered. The physician
is not only held to this standard but is also protected thereby. A
change in the applicable standard which would allow the trier of
fact more freedom in inferring negligence would defeat the public
interest that is being served by allowing a physician to freely
exercise his professional judgment with the knowledge that his
acts will be judged in accordance with those of his fellow practitioners.
Dennis Vidrine

